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Abstrat: In the ontext of applied game theory in networking environments, a
number of onepts have been proposed to measure both eieny and optimality
of resoure alloations, the most famous ertainly being the prie of anarhy and the
Jain index. Yet, very few have tried to question these measures and ompare them
one to another, in a general framework, whih is the aim of the present artile.
Key-words: Game theory, prie of anarhy, Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality,
Braess-like paradox.
Comment mesurer l'eaité?
Résumé : Dans le adre de la théorie des jeux appliquée aux réseaux de om-
muniations, de nombreux onepts ont été proposés an de mesurer l'eaité et
l'optimalité des méanismes d'alloation de ressoures, les plus élebres exemples
étant probablement le prix de l'anarhie et l'index de Jain. Cependant, rares sont
eux qui ont herhé à étudier es mesures et à les omparer entre elles, dans un
ontexte général. C'est e que propose de faire et artile.
Mots-lés : Théorie des jeux, prix de l'anarhie, équilibres de Nash, optimalité de
Pareto, paradoxes de Braess.
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1 Introdution
The networking ommunity has witnessed an impressive amount of work based on
appliations of game theory onepts. This paper fouses here on the ones dealing
with haraterizations of performane of general poliies.
We do not deal here with the hoie of users utility funtions. We onsider
some general utilities u, may they represent throughput, experiened delays. . . or any
utility funtion and study in this paper dierent alloation poliies. We distinguish
in partiular two kinds of poliies:
 those who are index-based, that is to say that result on the optimization of
a given funtion, as for example the Nash Bargaining Solution (also alled
proportional fairness), that maximizes the produt of the users' utilities, or
the soial utility (maximizing their sum).
 general poliy optimization. Those do not optimize a spei funtion. The
most ommon example being the Nash equilibrium.
While many denitions of eieny measure an be found in the literature, at
the present day, it seems that no fully satisfatory onept is available. The goal of
this artile is to present and study various ommonly used haraterizations of the
performane of poliies.
After introduing some general notations (Setion 2), we present some qualitative
haraterization of the alloations (Setion 3): in partiular the notion of Pareto
eieny (a general notion of eieny), of index-optimization (that would reet
some partiular property of eient points, as for example fairness), and Braess-like
paradoxes (a partiularly non-desirable property of alloation poliies). We then
analyze properties of alloations, in partiular regarding ontinuity (whih ensures
some stability of the alloation for slight hanges of the resoures) and monotoniity
(whih ensures that an adding of resoures will always be beneiary to the users).
Then, in Setion 4, we onsider quantitative measures of eieny. In partiular,
we disuss the onepts of Jain index, Prie of anarhy (and more generally of index-
optimizing based metris) and the reently introdued SDF (Selshness Degradation
Fator).
2 Notations
We onsider a n-player game, eah of them having a utility funtion whose values
belong to R+. A utility set U is thus a subset of R
n
+. Let H(R
n
+) denote the set
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non-empty ompat sets of R
n
+ and C(R
n
+) denote the set of non-empty ompat and
onvex sets of R
n
+. In the rest of this artile, we assume that U the set of all utility
sets is either equal to H(Rn+) or C(R
n
+). Any negative result regarding C(R
n
+) also
applies to H(Rn+).
We dene in this setion the two kinds of alloation studied (index-based or not)
and two onepts that will turn useful for the analytial study, namely the Hausdor
metri and some anonial partial orders.
Denition 1 (Poliy funtion). A poliy funtion α : U → Rn+ is a funtion suh
that for all U ∈ U , α(U) ∈ U .
Poliy funtions dened on H(Rn+) are said to be general poliy funtion and
poliy funtions dened on C(Rn+) are said to be onvex poliy funtion.
Note that in this framework, we do not onsider poliy optimization that depend
on previous states of the system. Suh systems an our for instane when onsid-
ering dynami systems where Nash equilibria adjusts to the system evolution. In the
event of multiple equilibria, the initial onditions have an impat on the onvergene
point.
Denition 2 (Index-optimizing). An index funtion f is a funtion from Rn+ to
R+. Let f be an index funtion from R
n
+ to R+. A poliy funtion α is said to be
f -optimizing if for all U ∈ U , f(α(U)) = supu∈U f(u).
Index may also be alled aggregation operators [2℄
To study the ontinuity of poliy funtions, we need a topology on U . That is
why in the following, we use the lassial metri on ompat sets.
Denition 3 (Hausdor metri). Considering a metri funtion d on Rn+, one an
dene the distane from x to the ompat B as:
d(x,B) = min{d(x, y)|y ∈ B}
The distane from the ompat A to the ompat B as:
d(A,B) = max{d(x,B)|x ∈ A}
The Hausdor distane between two ompats A and B an thus be dened as:
h(A,B) = max(d(A,B), d(B,A))
(H(Rn+), h) and (C(R
n
+), h) are omplete metri spaes [1℄ and we an thus study
the ontinuity of poliy funtions under pretty lean onditions.
INRIA
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Denition 4 (Canonial partial orders). We onsider the following orders as being
anonial.
 The anonial partial 4 order on Rn+ is dened by:
u 4 v ⇔ ∀k : uk 6 vk
 The anonial partial order on H(Rn+) is the lassial inlusion order: ⊆.
The two lassial strit partial order ≺ and ⊂ are dened aordingly.
 We also dene an additional strit partial order ≪ on Rn+, namely the strit
Pareto-superiority, by:
u≪ v ⇔ ∀k : uk < vk
3 Qualitative Charaterizations
In this setion, we fous on qualitative haraterizations of performane of alloa-
tions. Of partiular interest are:
 The notion of Pareto optimality: a onepts that dene the set of points of U
that are globally optimal,
 Index or aggregation operators: they reet the optimality of a point with
respet of a partiular riterion,
 Braess-like paradoxes: reets whether an inrease of the system resoure an
be detrimental to all users onurrently.
The rest of this setion is organized as follows: after dening these three funda-
mental onepts, we study the link between Pareto-optimality and index optimiza-
tion, the ontinuity of alloations and their monotoniity.
3.1 Common Denitions
We reall here the denitions of Pareto optimality, index-optimizing funtion and
Braess-like paradoxes.
Denition 5 (Pareto optimality). A hoie u ∈ U is said to be Pareto optimal if
∀v ∈ U,∃i, vi > ui ⇒ ∃j, vj < uj.
RR n° 6216
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In other words, u is Pareto optimal if it is maximal in U for the anonial partial
order on R
n
+.
A poliy funtion is said to be Pareto-optimal if for all U ∈ U , α(U) is Pareto-
optimal.
The key idea here is that Pareto optimality is a global notion. Even in systems
that onsists of independent elements, the Pareto optimality annot be determined
on eah independent subsystem. Suh phenomena has been exhibited in [6℄. The
onsidered system is a master-slave platform in whih the master an ommuniate
with as many slaves as it needs at any time. The master holds a innite number
of tasks orresponding to N appliations, and eah of them an be exeuted on
any slave. The authors study the system at the Nash equilibrium (eah appliation
ompeting with eah other for both resoure and CPU). Although the problems
assoiated with eah mahine is independent, the authors show that for any system
with one slave the equilibrium is Pareto optimal, while Pareto ineieny an our
in multiple slave systems.
Denition 6 (f -inreasing). A poliy alpha is said to be f -inreasing if f ◦ α is
monotone. Any f -optimizing poliy is thus f -inreasing.
Denition 7 (Common Indexes). Many dierent indexes have been proposed in
the literature. We present a few ones:
 Arithmeti mean:
∑
i ui.
 Minimum: mini ui.
 Maximum: maxi ui.
 Geometri Mean: also alled Nash Bargaining Solution or proportional fair-
ness
∏
i ui.
 Harmoni Mean:
1P
i
1/ui
.
 Quasi-arithmeti Mean: f−1( 1n
∑n
i=1 f(ui)) where f is a stritly monotone
ontinuous funtion on [0,+∞]. The partiular ase where f is dened by
f : x → xδ has been widely studied [7℄. The ve previous index are partiular
ase of this index for partiular values of δ (respetively, 1,−∞,+∞, 0 and
−1).
 Jain:
(
P
ui)
2
P
u2
i
(see [3℄).
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 Ordered Weighted Averaging: OWA(u1, . . . , un) =
∑
iwi.uσ(i) where σ is
a permutation suh that uσ(1) 6 uσ(2) 6 · · · 6 uσ(n).
All these indexes are ontinuous, however, some of them are not stritly monotone.
Denition 8 (Braess-paradox). A poliy funtion α is said to have Braess-paradoxes
it there exists U1 and U2 suh that
U1 ⊂ U2 and α(U1)≫ α(U2)
with ≫ dened as in denition 4. A poliy funtion suh that there is no Braess-
paradox is alled Braess-paradox-free.
3.2 Pareto-optimality and Index Optimization
Pareto optimality and monotoniity of the index optimization are losely related, as
illustrated in the following results.
Theorem 1. Let α be an f -optimizing poliy. If f is stritly monotone then α is
Pareto-optimal.
Proof. Suppose that α is not Pareto optimal. Then, there exists U suh that α(U)
is not Pareto optimal. Hene, there exists v ∈ U suh that α(U) ≺ v, and hene
f(α(U)) < f(v), whih ontradits the denition of α(U).
Theorem 2. Let α be an f -optimizing poliy. If α is Pareto-optimal then f is
monotone.
Proof. Suppose that f is not monotone. Then there exists u ≺ v suh that f(v) ≺
f(u). Consider U = {u, v}. As u ≺ v and α is Pareto-optimal, then α(U) = v whih
is in ontradition with f(v) ≺ f(u).
The Jain index is an example of non-monotone index. The min and the max
index are also not stritly monotone, whih is why, max-min fairness or min-max
fairness are reursively dened in the literature.
3.3 Continuity
Let us assume that the set of resoures is modeled as a ompat R of Rp+ and that
utility of users g are ontinuous funtions from Rp+ to R+. Then utility sets U are
built with the help of R and g.
RR n° 6216
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U :
{
(H(Rn+), C(R
p
+,R+)) →H(R
n
+)
(R, g) 7→ {g(r)|r ∈ R}
The mapping U being ontinuous, α◦U represents the sensibility of the alloation
with respet to resoures and utility funtions. Continuity of the alloation α is thus
an essential feature. Indeed, it ensures that a slight hange in the system resoures
would not signiantly aet the alloation. In dynamially hanging systems, this
ensures a ertain stability. It also ensures that a slight error in utility funtions does
not aet too muh the alloation.
Theorem 3. The Pareto set of a onvex utility set is not neessarily ompat.
The funtion P from C(Rn+) to H(R
n
+) that assoiates to U the losure of its
Pareto set is not ontinuous.
Proof. Let us rst exhibit a onvex utility set whose Pareto set is not losed. Let
C = {(x, y, z) ∈ R3+|x
2 + y2 6 1, 0 6 z 6 1 − 12
x2−2y2+1
1−y }. The set C is depited
on Figure 1. We have P(C) = {(x, y, 1 − 12
x2−2y2+1
1−y )|x
2 + y2 6 1, x + y > 1, x >
0} ∪ {(0, 1, 1)}, whih is not losed.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
Z
XY
B
A
Figure 1: Convex set whose Pareto set is not losed. The segment [A,B[ does not
belong to the Pareto set.
Let us onsider P from C(Rn+) to H(R
n
+) that assoiate to U the losure of its
Pareto set. Figure 2 depits a onverging sequene of onvex Cn suh that P(Cn)
does not onverge to P(C∞).
INRIA
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C0 P(C0) Cn P(Cn) C∞
P(C∞)
Figure 2: P is not ontinuous.
Theorem 4. Let α be a general Pareto-optimal poliy funtion. α is not ontinuous.
Proof. We prove that α annot be ontinuous with the simple instanes depited on
Figure 3. The only Pareto-optimal points are A and B. Therefore α has to hoose in
the rst set between A and B. If A1 is hosen, then by moving A1 to A0, the hoie
has to jump to B, hene α is not ontinuous.
A0
B
An
B A∞ B
Figure 3: General Pareto-optimal poliies are disontinuous: a path leading to dis-
ontinuity.
Remark 1. There exists ontinuous and non-ontinuous onvex Pareto-optimal pol-
iy funtions.
Proof. Let us onsider a poliy funtion α optimizing the sum of utilities. The
two onvex sets on Figure 4 show that α is not ontinuous around the set K =
{(x, y)|x + y 6 1}. This disontinuity is due to the fat that many dierent points
of K simultaneously optimize the sum.
The poliy funtion α optimizing the produt
∏
of utilities is ontinuous though.
As
∏
is stritly monotone, α is Pareto-optimal. Moreover, as for any c, Ic = {x ∈
RR n° 6216
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Figure 4: Optimizing
∑
: a disontinuous onvex poliy.
R
n
+|
∏
xi > c} is stritly onvex, for any onvex, there is a single point optimizing the∏
. Let us assume by ontradition that α is not ontinuous at the point C. Then
there exists Cn onverging to C and suh that xn = α(Cn) onverges to x∞ 6= α(C).
As our sets are ompat, there exists a sequene yn ∈ Cn suh that yn onverges to
α(C). By denition, we have ∀n,
∏
(yn) 6
∏
(xn). Therefore
∏
(α(C)) 6
∏
(x∞),
whih is absurd as α(C) is optimal in C for
∏
and α(C) 6= x∞.
3.4 Monotoniity
We state in this sub-setion two results on monotoniity of index and poliy funtions.
The rst one emphasizes that index-funtions only measures a spei harateristi
of performane measure, and are hene not ompatible. This explains why alloations
that are eient (optimizing the arithmeti mean) annot (in general) also be fair
(optimizing the geometri mean).
The seond result states that, even when restrited to onvex utility sets, poliy
funtions annot be monotone. This infers that even in Braess-free systems, and
inrease in the resoure an be detrimental to some users.
Theorem 5. Let f and g be two monotone index funtions. A g-optimizing poliy
αg is f -inreasing if and only if αg is f -optimizing.
Proof. If αg is f -optimizing, then αg is learly f -inreasing.
Let us assume that αg is not f -optimizing. We dene the partial order ≺f (resp.
≺g) on R
n
+ by x ≺f y i f(x) 6 f(y). We have ≺f 6=≺g, otherwise αg would be
f -optimizing. Thus there exists x1 and x2 suh that: x1 ≺f x2 and x2 ≺g x1.
Considering U = {x1} and U
′ = {x1, x2}, shows that αg is not f -inreasing.
INRIA
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In other words, a poliy optimizing an index f is always non-monotone for a
distint index g.
Theorem 6. Even if onvex, poliy funtions annot be monotone.
Proof. Let us onsider α a monotone onvex poliy funtion and let us onsider the
three following onvex sets U1 = {(0, 1)}, U2 = {(1, 0)}, and U3 = {(x, 1 − x)|0 6
x 6 1} (see Figure 5).
U1
U2
U3
Figure 5: Even onvex poliy funtions annot be monotone.
We neessarily have α(U1) = (0, 1) and α(U2) = (1, 0). As U1 and U2 are subsets
of U3, we have α(U3) < (1, 1), whih is absurd beause no suh point belongs to
U3.
3.5 Conlusion
In this setion, we have established the following results:
 Indexes should be stritly monotone to ensure Pareto-Optimality.
 Continuity (of alloations) is only possible when onsidering onvex utility sets.
 It is impossible to ensure that the growth of the utility set does not inur the
derease of the utility of some player (i.e. poliy funtions annot be monotone,
even when restriting to onvex utility sets).
 A poliy optimizing a given index f leads to errati values of an other index g
when growing utility sets (unless f and g indue the same optimization).
RR n° 6216
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Note that even though being Braess-paradox-free does not lead to bad properties,
it does not give any information on the eieny of suh poliies. For example,
an alloation α that would be dened as returning 1/1000 of the NBS to all users
would obviously be Braess-paradox-free but is very ineient. This alls for more
quantitative haraterization of eieny.
4 Quantitative Charaterizations
How to measure the eieny of a given poliy is still an open question. Many
approahes have been proposed in the literature but we will see in Setion 4.1 that
none of the previously proposed approah is fully satisfying. We disuss in partiular
the most two popular ones: the Jain index [3℄ and the Prie of Anarhy [5℄. Then
in Setion 4.2, we propose a new metri based on a more topologial point of view
and explain how it relates to the notion of ε-approximation [8℄.
4.1 Disussion
4.1.1 Jain index
The Jain eieny measure (or Jain index) [3℄ of a hoie u is dened as (
P
ui)
2
n
P
u2
i
.
The Jain index is thus the ratio of the rst to the seond moment of the hoie u.
Hene, it is a good measure of a hoie fairness (as dened by max-min fairness).
The Jain index has many interesting properties:
 It is independent of the number of users.
 It remains unhanged if the utility set is linearly saled.
 It is bounded (by 1/n and 1).
 It is ontinuous.
It an be straight-forwardly adapted to any measure of fairness when onsidering
the ratio of the rst and seond moment of z where for all i, zi = ui/vi where vi is
the fair onsidered point. Another interpretation of the Jain index is to write it as:
1/n
∑
i(ui/uf ) where uf = (
∑
u2i )/(
∑
ui). Then eah ui/uf represents the ratio of
the hoie with the fair alloation. The Jain is then the mean of these values. The
index is therefore onsidered a useful distane measure to a given fair point.
INRIA
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The interest of the Jain fator is to determine whih users are disriminated, and
whih are favored in a given alloation. Transfer of share from favored to disriminate
users always inrease the index, while the opposite redues it.
However, as we have seen in Setion 3.2 the Jain index is non-monotone (see
Figure 6(a)), hene optimal solutions for the Jain index may not be Pareto-optimal.
Even worse, some max-min fair alloations (that are as fair as possible) may have
sub-optimal Jain index. Suh an example is given on Figure 6(b).
α = 1
α = .9
α = .8
α = .7
α = .7
α = .8
α = .9
(a) Isolines for the Jain Index:
this index is not monotone.
α = 1
α = .96
(b) The max-min fair alloation may
have a sub-optimal Jain index.
Figure 6: Highlighting Jain's index aws.
4.1.2 Prie of Anarhy and Index-Optimizing Based Metris
Index-optimizing based metris are easy to ompute, ontinuous and generally on-
serve Pareto-superiority (under some mild onditions). It is thus natural to selet
an index f and to try to ompare an alloation to the optimal one for f . Papadim-
itriou [5℄ introdued the now popular measure prie of anarhy that we will study
in this setion.
For a given index f , let us onsider α(f) a f -optimizing poliy funtion. We
dene the ineieny If (β,U) of the alloation β(U) for f as
If (β,U) =
f(α(f)(U))
f(β(U))
> 1
= max
u∈U
f(u)
f(β(U))
. (1)
RR n° 6216
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Utility Set
Nash Equilibrium
Prot Alloation
Max-min Alloation
u1
0
0
1
N−1
uk
M
1
Figure 7: Utility set and alloations for SM,N (N = 3,M = 2), with u2 = · · · = uN .
Papadimitriou fouses on the arithmeti mean Σ dened by Σ(u1, . . . , uk) =
∑K
k=1 uk.
The prie of anarhy φΣ is thus dened as the largest ineieny:
φΣ(β) = sup
U∈U
If (β,U) = sup
U∈U
∑
k α
(Σ)(U)k∑
k β(U)k
In other words, φΣ(β) is the approximation ratio of β for the objetive funtion Σ.
This measure is very popular and rather easy to understand. However, we will see
that it may not reet what people have in mind when speaking about prie of
anarhy.
Consider the utility set SM,N = {u ∈ R
N
+ |u1/M +
∑N
k=1 uk 6 1} depited in
Fig 7. As the roles of the uk, k > 2 are symmetri, we an freely assume that
u2 = · · · = uN for metrial index-optimizing poliies.
Remark 2. This example was taken from the master-slave sheduling problem of [6℄.
It is then easy to ompute the following index optimizing alloation:
 α(Σ)(SM,N) = (M, 0, . . . , 0) orresponds to the alloation optimizing the aver-
age utility;
 α(min)(SM,N ) =
(
1
N−1+1/M , . . . ,
1
N−1+1/M
)
orresponds to the max-min fair
alloation [9℄;
 α(Π)(SM,N ) =
(
M
N ,
1
N , . . . ,
1
N
)
orresponds to the proportionally fair alloation
whih is a partiular Nash Bargaining Solution [9℄.
INRIA
How to measure eieny? 15
Note that, α(Σ), α(min), and α(Π) are Pareto optimal by denition. One an easily
ompute the prie of anarhy of the Nash Bargaining solution:
IΣ(α
(Π), SM,N ) =
M
M
N +
N−1
N
−−−−→
M→∞
N.
The prie of anarhy is therefore unbounded. However, the fat that this alloation
is Pareto-optimal and has interesting properties of fairness (it orresponds to a Nash
Bargaining Solution [9℄) questions the relevane of the prie of anarhy notion as a
Pareto eieny measure.
Likewise, the ineieny of the max-min fair alloation is equivalent to M for
large values of M (as opposed to K for the non-ooperative equilibrium). It an
hene be unbounded even for bounded number of appliations and mahines. This
seems even more surprising as suh points generally result from omplex ooperations
and are hene Pareto optimal. These remarks raise one more the question of the
measure of Pareto ineieny.
These are due to the fat that a poliy optimizing an index f is always non-
monotone for a distint index g (from Theorem 5). Hene any poliy (inluding
Pareto optimal ones) optimizing a distint index from the arithmeti mean will ex-
periene a bad prie of anarhy. Note that the previous problems are not spei to
the eieny measure arithmeti mean. The same kind of behavior an be exhibited
when using the min or the produt of the throughputs for instane.
That is why we think that Pareto ineieny should be measured as the distane
to the Pareto border and not to a spei point.
4.1.3 Selshness Degradation Fator
To quantify the degradation of Braess-like Paradoxes (the degree of Paradox), Kameda [4℄
introdued the Pareto-omparison of α and β as ̺(α, β) = mink
αk
βk
. Therefore, α is
stritly superior to β i ̺(α, β) > 1. Intuitively ̺ represents the performane degra-
dation between α and β. Using this denition, the following denition of Pareto
ineieny, named Selshness Degradation Fator (SDF), was proposed [6℄:
ISDF (β,U) = max
u∈U
̺(u, β(U)) = max
u∈U
min
k
uk
β(U)k
(2)
Therefore β(U) is Pareto ineient as soon as ISDF (β,U) > 1 and the larger
ISDF (β,U), the more ineient the alloation.
Lemma 1. Let us dene = {x ∈ Rn|∃k : xk 6 0}. We denote by a⊞ = {x ∈
R
n|∃k : xk 6 ak}.
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Figure 8: Ineieny for the selshness degradation fator: log(U) ⊂ (log(β(U))+ε)
log(ISDF (β,U)) 6 ε⇔ log(U) ⊆ (log(β(U)) + ε)⊞
Proof.
log(ISDF (β,U)) 6 ε⇔ max
u∈U
min
k
log(
uk
β(U)k
) 6 ε
⇔ ∀u ∈ U,∃k, log(uk)− log(β(U)k) 6 ε
⇔ ∀u ∈ U,∃k, log(uk) 6 log(β(U)k) + ε
⇔ ∀u ∈ U, log(u) ∈ (log(β(U)) + ε)⊞
⇔ log(U) ⊆ (log(β(U)) + ε)⊞
Figure 8 depits a graphial interpretation of this ineieny measure. As illus-
trated by the previous lemma, this ineieny seems to measure how muh β(U)
should be inreased so that it is not dominated by any other points in U . Therefore,
log(ISDF (β,U)) somehow measures the distane in the log-spae from β(U) to the
Pareto set. However, as we will see in the next setion, this denition holds only
beause of the very spei shape of the set U used in this example.
Anyway, the selshness degradation fator an, as in setion 4.1.2, be dened
from this ineieny measure:
φ = sup
U∈U
ISDF (β,U) = sup
U∈U
max
u∈U
min
k
uk
β(U)k
.
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A system (e.g., queuing network, transportation network, load-balaning, ...) that
would be suh that the Nash equilibria are always Pareto optimal would have a
selshness degradation fator equal to one. The selshness degradation fator may
however be unbounded on systems where non-ooperative equilibria are partiu-
larly ineient. The relevane of this denition is orroborated by the fat that
ε-approximations of Pareto-sets dened by Yannakakis and Papadimitriou [8℄ have
a degradation fator of exp(ε) ≃ 1 + ε.
4.2 A Topologial Point of View
In this setion, we go bak to the ineieny measure introdued in the previous
setion and show that suh a measure an be properly dened only when referring
to the whole Pareto set. Indeed, what we are interested in is in fat some kind of
distane of a point to the Pareto set. As researhers are used to look at fators when
evaluating the performane of an algorithm, this distane to the Pareto set should be
measured in the log spae. As we have seen in the previous setion, the ineieny
measure for the selshness degradation fator is losely related to the distane to
the Pareto set. More preisely, we prove that being lose to the Pareto set implies
a small measure of ineieny. However, the onverse is true only when the utility
set has some partiular properties.
The distane from β(U) to the losure of the Pareto set P(U) in the log-spae is
equal to:
d∞(log(β(U), log(P(U))) = min
u∈P(u)
max
k
| log(β(U)k)− log(uk)|
Therefore, we an dene
I˜∞(β,U) = exp(d∞(log(β(U), log(P(U)))
= min
u∈P(u)
max
k
max
(
β(U)k
uk
,
uk
β(U)k
)
(3)
Let us reall the lassial expansion denition:
X ⊕ a = {y|d(x, y) 6 a, for some x ∈ X}
This denition an be easily expanded as:
X ⊗ a = exp(log(X)⊕ log(a))
= {y| exp(d(log(x), log(y)) 6 a for some x ∈ X}
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Denition 9 (ε-approximation). [8℄ denes an ε-approximation of P(U) as a set of
points S suh that for all u ∈ U there exists some s ∈ S suh that ∀k : uk 6 (1+ε)sk.
With the previous notations, it is easy to see that:
Theorem 7. S ⊆ U is an ε-approximation of P(U) i P(U) ⊆ S ⊗ exp(ε).
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Figure 9: Distane to the Pareto set
Figure 9(d) depits the expansion of log(P(U)) by ε so that it ontains log(β(U)).
It is easy to show that:
Lemma 2. I˜∞(β,U) 6 exp(ε)⇔ β(U) ∈ P(U)⊗ exp(ε).
INRIA
How to measure eieny? 19
In other words, I˜∞(β,U) 6 exp(ε) i β(U) is no farther than ε from P(U) in the
log spae.
When omparing the denitions of IΣ, ISDF and I˜∞, the latest may seem harder
to ompute as it relies on P(U). However, what we are interested in is measuring
the distane to the Pareto set and no index-based ineieny measure an reet
this distane. Then an only reet a partiular property of the alloation suh as
fairness. Note that in mono-riteria situations, it is natural to ompare a solution
to an intratable optimal solution, generally using approximations or lower bounds.
Therefore, similar approahes should be used in multi-riteria settings to ompute
I˜∞. This ineieny measure is thus a natural extension of the lassial mono-riteria
performane ratio.
The previous denition should thus be used in the general ase, even though in
a some partiular situations, the SDF denition is suient.
5 Conlusion
In this paper, we have addressed the question of how to properly measure eieny of
alloations, may they be obtained as the result of some index-funtion optimization
or some general poliy. We have shown a number of results, both at qualitative and
quantitative level. In partiular, we have shown that:
 Monotoniity is the link between index-optimization and Pareto optimality.
 When utilities are ontinuous with the system's resoures, solution alloations
an be ontinuous in the resoures only when the utility sets are onvex.
 Even with Braess-free alloations, there always exists instanes where resoure
inrease is detrimental to at least one user.
 A poliy optimizing a given index leads to errati values for another index when
utility sets grow.
 Both the Jain index and the prie of anarhy have aws as measures of the
ineieny of an equilibria.
 A orret general ineieny measure an be dened and is based on the log
spae as the distane of a point to the Pareto border.
We believe that these results an serve as a general theoretial milestones to any
researher aiming at analyzing the performane of an alloation in a spei problem.
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